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The focus of this paper is on policies that set out simultaneously to 
control the exchange rate and monetary conditions (an instrument interest 
rate, for example) in situations where capital mobility is unrestricted, there 
is an excess supply of international currency and the central bank sets 
targets for the exchange rate and interest rate. The paper calculates how 
high the local interest rate can go at any time without rendering monetary 
sterilization policy unsustainable, defines the degree of monetary autonomy 
as the difference between this rate on the one hand and the sum of the 
international interest rate and the rate of increase in the exchange rate on 
the other, and analyses how the degree of autonomy evolves. Numerical 
examples using data from Argentina and elsewhere suggest that sterilization 
policy is sustainable and that a considerable degree of monetary autonomy 
exists in contexts that are by no means unusual in many developing 
economies.
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I
Introduction
In a context of free capital mobility, the central bank can 
simultaneously control the exchange rate and the interest 
rate. This runs directly counter to what is claimed by 
the so-called “trilemma” of an economy open to capital 
movements. Here we argue that this trilemma is false 
in certain circumstances and, consequently, is false as 
a general theorem.
The condition for combining control of the exchan-
ge rate with the preservation of monetary autonomy 
is the existence of an excess supply of international 
currency at the exchange rate targeted by the central 
bank. That is, the conditions in the current account 
and capital account are such that the local currency 
would appreciate if the bank did not intervene to hold 
down the exchange rate. In this context, the monetary 
authority can set the exchange rate by purchasing the 
excess supply in the currency market and can control 
the interest rate by sterilizing the monetary effects of 
this intervention, which it does by issuing treasury or 
central bank bonds in the money market. The central 
bank has two instruments for achieving its two goals: 
intervention in the foreign currency market to set the 
exchange rate and intervention in the money market to 
determine the interest rate.
An excess supply of currency, at the exchange rate 
targeted by the central bank and at the current interest 
rate, implies an excess demand for local assets. Fully 
sterilized intervention can be seen as a policy that is 
implemented in two stages. In the first, central bank 
intervention in the currency market leads to an increase in 
the monetary base. As a result there is a larger monetary 
base, an unaltered stock of local assets and an interest 
rate lower than the initial one. In the second stage, 
full sterilization completely offsets the change in the 
private-sector portfolio that occurred in the first stage. 
The central bank absorbs the increase in the monetary 
base and issues an amount of local assets equivalent to 
the initial excess demand for these assets (the excess 
supply of currency), returning the local interest rate to its 
previous level (Bofinger and Wollmershäuser, 2003).
An excess supply of international currency at 
the exchange rate targeted by the central bank is what 
invalidates the “trilemma” and empowers that bank to 
set the exchange rate and the interest rate. We believe 
that this idea is unfamiliar because the specialized 
literature dealing with monetary autonomy and with 
currency regimes and policies rarely addresses condi-
tions in which there is an excess supply of international 
currency, mainly concentrating instead on situations of 
balance-of-payments deficit.
In situations of deficit, the “trilemma” does indeed 
usually hold true. In conditions of excess demand in the 
currency market, the ability even of powerful central 
banks to intervene in that market is ultimately limited 
by the available amount of reserves. In situations of 
excess demand for international currency, therefore, 
not even these central banks can adopt an exchange-rate 
target without affecting the interest rate. But there is no 
symmetry between situations of deficit and surplus in the 
balance of payments, however. The “trilemma” is valid 
in one case but not in the other (Frenkel, 2007).
Sterilized buying operations can be carried out at any 
time. But can this policy be applied continuously? Not 
in every circumstance. The sustainability of the policy 
depends on the interest rate earned by the international 
reserves, on the local interest rate, on the exchange-rate 
trend and on the evolution of the variables determining 
the supply of and demand for the monetary base. The 
main conclusion of this paper is that there is a maximum 
local interest rate above which the policy of sterilization 
becomes unsustainable. In conditions of excess supply of 
international currency at the targeted exchange rate, the 
central bank can set the exchange rate and is free to set a 
local interest rate no higher than that maximum without 
giving rise to an unsustainable trend. We set forth this 
conclusion in a previous paper (Frenkel, 2007). Here 
we present a formal model to justify it.
The paper is presented as follows. Following this 
introduction, section II describes the problem and defines 
the degree of monetary autonomy. Section III presents 
the model and defines and derives the sustainability 
condition; it also shows that this condition is equivalent 
to the central bank having non-negative financial results. 
Section IV discusses the dynamic of the sustainability 
condition. Section V defines and derives the condition 
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for the permanence of the degree of monetary autonomy; 
both this section and section III include numerical exam-
ples with data similar to those observed in Argentina in 
late 2006. Lastly, section VI presents two interesting 
applications of the results obtained. Both are illustrated 
using numerical examples to show that the conditions 
for sustainability and permanence exist in situations that 
are by no means unusual.
II
The cost of sterilization and the degree  
of monetary autonomy
At any point in time, the unit cost of sterilization is 
s = i – r – e, where s is the cost of sterilization, i the local 
interest rate, r the international interest rate and e = dE/E 
(E = pesos / US$) the rate of increase in the price of the 
international currency. The sterilization cost s is nil if 
i = r + e, i.e., if the local interest rate is equal to the sum 
of the international interest rate and the rate of increase 
in the exchange rate. Or (which comes to the same thing) 
if the uncovered interest parity (uip) condition is strictly 
met (Bofinger and Wollmershäuser, 2003).
A policy of sterilization is obviously sustainable if 
the cost of sterilization is nil or negative. If this were the 
sustainability condition, the policy of sterilization would 
only be sustainable if i ≤ r + e, i.e., r + e would be the 
maximum value of the interest rate needed to keep the 
policy of sterilization sustainable.1 Rates higher than 
this would make the policy unsustainable.
In what follows we show that the condition 
referred to is not necessary for sustainability. We 
demonstrate that the policy can be sustainable with 
local interest rates higher than r + e and we calcula-
te the maximum rate at which sterilization remains 
sustainable. For this we formulate a simple model 
which takes account of the fact that, in addition to 
interest-bearing financial assets, the public demands 
and the central bank issues a monetary base which is 
not interest-bearing.
The above considerations suggest that the degree of 
monetary autonomy should be defined as the difference 
between the maximum local interest rate at which the 
policy of sterilization is sustainable and r + e. If this 
maximum rate is termed imax and the degree of monetary 
autonomy g, we get: g = imax – (r + e).
Given the international interest rate and the rate of 
increase in the exchange rate, then the higher the local 
interest rate that can be set without rendering the policy 
of sterilization unsustainable, the greater the degree of 
autonomy.
1 It may happen that i ≤ r + e (a) and there is still excess supply on the 
currency market. This can arise because capital flows are a function 
of i – (r + E(e)) (b), where E(e) is the expected rate of increase in the 
exchange rate. It can happen that E(e) < e for fairly long periods, so 
that expression b is positive even when expression a subsequently 
proves to hold true. For example, this situation has been present in 
recent years in China, where the local interest rate is lower than the 
sum of the United States Federal Reserve interest rate and the rate of 
increase in the exchange rate (see McKinnon and Schnabl, 2006).
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The central bank has international reserves as its only 
asset. In addition, it issues two liabilities, monetary base 
and sterilization bills yielding the local interest rate i. 
Thus, P = B + L, where P is the total stock of central 
bank liabilities, B the outstanding monetary base and L 
the stock of interest-bearing liabilities.
At interest rate i and exchange rate E there is an 
excess supply of international currency C in the currency 
market, which the central bank purchases. The increase 
in the bank’s total liabilities is
 dP = dB + dL = C E + i L (1)
where C E is the peso value of flow C, while i L is the 
flow of interest the central bank has to pay on stock L 
of interest-bearing liabilities.
Let us suppose that dP > dB, so that dL > 0.
The increase in monetary base demand is
 dB = B β (p + y) (2)
where p is the inflation rate, y is the real GDP growth 
rate and β is the demand-elasticity of the monetary base 
to nominal GDP.
R is the central bank’s stock of international reserves 
(in international currency) and d(R E) is the increase in the 
peso value of these reserves. The international reserves 
yield r, the international interest rate. Therefore,
 d(R E) = R dE + E dR =
                      = R dE + E (C + r R) =
                   = R dE + E C + E r R (3)
The sustainability condition for the sterilization 
policy is defined as dP ≤ d(R E). This condition means 
that the sterilization policy is sustainable if the ratio 
between the central bank’s total liabilities and the peso 
value of the international reserves P/(R E) does not 
increase.




Dividing expression (4) by R E gives:
		 i	L/R	E	≤	e	+	r	y
	 i	≤	(e	+	r)	/	(L/R	E) (5)
The sterilization policy is sustainable when local 
interest rates are no higher than the second term of expre-
ssion (5). We use the term lR = L/R E for the ratio between 
the stock of interest-bearing central bank liabilities and 
the local-currency value of the international reserves, 
and formulate the sustainability condition as
		 i	≤	(e	+	r)	/	lR  (6)
If lR < 1, then the level of local interest rates at which 
the sterilization policy remains sustainable can be higher 
than e + r, and the lower the lR ratio then the higher they 
can be. As was pointed out earlier, the operations of the 
central bank determine the local interest rate and the 
exchange rate at all times. The sustainability of these 
operations depends on the local and international rates, 
on lR and on the trend of the exchange rate over time.
The maximum local interest rate at which the steri-
lization policy remains sustainable is imax = (r + e) / lR. 
Consequently, the degree of monetary autonomy is:
  g = imax	–	(r	+	e)	=
	 =	(r	+	e)	(1	–	lR)	/	lR
The degree of monetary autonomy, i.e., the diffe-
rence between the highest sustainable local rate and 
r + e, is thus expressed as a proportion of r + e. The 
lower lR is, the higher the degree of autonomy.
The central bank’s financial (quasi-fiscal) result2
The central bank financial result is Cf ≈ R E (r + e) – i L. 
The condition of a non-negative financial result is
	 Cf	≈	R	E	(r	+	e)	–	i	L	≥	0	 (7)
Dividing by R E gives Cf / R E ≈ r + e – i lR ≥ 
0, whence
2  This point was suggested by Javier Okseniuk.
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	 i	≤	(e	+	r)	/	lR = imax  (8)
Expression (8) is the same as the sustainability con-
dition (6) we derived earlier. That condition equates to the 
central bank having a non-negative financial result.
A numerical example using approximate data from 
Argentina in late 
To illustrate the results presented, we shall now calculate 
the indicators using approximate data from the Argentine 
economy in late 2006.
Let us suppose that r = 4%, e = 3%, i = 10% and 
lR = 43%. In that case the highest rate consistent with 
sustainability was: imax = (r + e) / lR = 16.3%. What that 
means is that the sterilization policy was sustainable 
at interest rates of up to 16.3%. The actual rate was 
10%, which was below the highest sustainable rate, 
so that the sterilization policy met the sustainability 
condition.
The degree of monetary autonomy with the parame-
ters referred to is g = imax – (r + e) = 9.3%. The interest 
rate could exceed the sum of the international interest 
rate and the rate of increase in the exchange rate by 9.3 
percentage points without rendering the sterilization 
policy unsustainable. With the parameters described, 
there is a wide margin of monetary autonomy.
IV
The dynamics of the sustainability condition
Given r and e, the sustainability condition (6) establishes 
at each point in time the range of interest rates that 
preserve the sustainability of sterilization as a function 
of lR. The relationship can be seen in figure 1.
The curve illustrates the relationship between imax 
and lR. At time 0, the relationship between the stock of 
interest-bearing central bank liabilities and the value of 
reserves is lRO and interest rates that preserve sustaina-
bility are those lower than imax. The degree of monetary 
autonomy g at that time is measured by the distance 
between imax and r + e on the vertical axis.
The lR ratio varies over time, altering the range of 
sustainable interest rates and the degree of monetary 
autonomy. As lR moves along the horizontal axis over 
time, the curve determines the movement of the maxi-
mum interest rate, of the range of sustainable rates and 
of the degree of autonomy on the vertical axis.
These considerations indicate that it would be advi-
sable to analyse the trend of the sustainability condition 
to establish whether the highest interest rate consistent 
with a sustainable policy of sterilization tends to rise 
or fall over time. Or, what comes to the same thing, 
whether developments in the monetary variables and the 
currency market tend to increase or reduce the degree 
of monetary autonomy.
FIGURE 1
lR0 1 lR 
i 
r +  e  
imax
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For the purpose described, we define the permanence 
condition of the degree of monetary autonomy as:
		 d(L/R	E)	=	dlR	≤	0  (9)
If the monetary and currency market variables meet 
condition (9), the highest sustainable interest rate and 
the degree of autonomy tend to remain stable or increa-
se. If condition (9) is not met, the degree of autonomy 
tends to fall. We shall now express the permanence 
condition as a function of the monetary and currency 
market variables.
Equation (9) gives
 d(L/R E) = [dL R E – L d(R E)] / (R E)2 ≤ 0 (10)
Considering that dL = dP – dB and substituting (1), 
(2) and (3) into (10), after some simplifications we get 
C E + i L – B β (p + y) – L (C/R + r + e) ≤ 0.
It is convenient to regroup the terms so as to leave 
on the left-hand side of the expression only those that 
include C, which is the flow of central bank foreign-
currency purchases: C/(L/E) – C/R ≤ r + e – i + (B/L) β 
(p + y). Considering that lR = (L/E)/R and regrouping, 
we get:
								C/R	≤	[lR	/	(1	–	lR)] {( B/L ) β (p + y) – 
	 [	i	–	(r	+	e)	]}  (11)
Given the interest rate and the exchange-rate trend, 
both of which it determines, the central bank does not 
control the excess supply of international currency in 
the exchange market. The degree of autonomy remains 
if the variables referred to meet condition (11). In this 
expression, the permanence condition is formulated as 
a restriction on the ratio between the flow of foreign 
currency purchased by the central bank and the stock 
of international reserves. If the sustainability condition 
is to remain stable or the degree of monetary autonomy 
increase, the C/R ratio must not be higher than the right-
hand term of expression (11). A larger flow of purchases 
means that the degree of autonomy tends to fall.
The right-hand side of expression (11) includes all 
variables relating to the monetary structure and dynamic 
of the economy. The restriction depends positively on 
lR, on the ratio between the outstanding monetary base 
and the stock of interest-bearing liabilities and on the 
rate of monetary base demand growth. The higher these 
variables, the more foreign exchange the central bank can 
purchase in the currency market without affecting the 
permanence of the sustainability condition. At the same 
time, the restriction depends negatively on the difference 
between the current local interest rate and r + e.
A further numerical example using approximate data 
from Argentina in late 2006
Let us suppose that in late 2006 B/L = 1.75, elasticity 
β = 1, i = 10%, r = 4%, e = 3%, lR = 43%, international 
reserves R = US$ 31 billion and the projected 2007 rate 
of growth in nominal GDP (p + y) = 19%. The term 
[lR / (1 – lR)] = 0.75.
With these inputs, expression (11) yields the follo-
wing permanence condition: C/R ≤ 22.7%.
The permanence of the degree of monetary au-
tonomy in late 2006 required that the flow of dollar 
purchases not exceed 22.7% of reserves, i.e., some US$ 
7 billion a year. A larger flow of purchases would tend 
to reduce the maximum sustainable rate and the degree 
of monetary autonomy.
In fact, 2007 projections were for a flow of interna-
tional currency purchases exceeding the maximum level 
that would preserve the degree of monetary autonomy. 
This is not too alarming as, given the other parameters, 
the consequent rise in lR has a relatively small effect on 
the maximum sustainable interest rate and the degree of 
autonomy. In fact, dlR can be calculated directly from 
equation (10) and the values of the parameters given. If 
it is assumed, for example, that C/R = 40%, then lR rises 
by 10 percentage points in a year (from 43% to 53%) and, 
given the other parameters, the maximum sustainable 
rate falls by 0.7% (from 16.3% to 15.6%).
At the same time, it is worth stressing the sensiti-
vity of the maximum sustainable rate and the degree of 
autonomy to the trend of the exchange rate. For example, 
when lR = 43%, every percentage point increase (decrease) 
in the exchange rate increases (reduces) the maximum 
sustainable interest rate by 1% / 0.43 = 2.33%. If the 
rate of increase in e is zero instead of 3% a year, the 
maximum interest rate falls by seven percentage points, 
from 16.3% to 9.3%.
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We shall now look at two interesting applications of the 
sustainability and permanence conditions derived above, 
illustrating the degree of monetary autonomy in different 
circumstances. In both cases monetary policy keeps 
the real exchange rate constant. In both, consequently, 
e = p – p*, where p* is the international inflation rate.
Case 1
In this case, the local inflation rate is the same as the 
international one, p = p*, so that e = 0. Substituting 
into (6), the sustainability condition in this case comes 
out as:i	≤	r	/	lR = imax. If lR < 1, there is some degree of 
monetary autonomy even if the rate of variation in the 
exchange rate is nil.
The permanence condition in this case is:
	 C/R	≤	[lR	/	(1	–	lR)] [(B/L)
 β (p + y) – (i – r)] (12)
The central bank can purchase international curren-
cy and retain its degree of monetary autonomy as long 
as the flow of purchases meets condition (12) and the 
expression is positive. That is: (B/L) β (p + y) > (i – r). 
The condition states that the increase in monetary base 
demand (function of the inflation rate and the growth 
rate), in proportion to the stock of interest-bearing lia-
bilities, must be greater than the difference between the 
local interest rate and the international rate.
There is nothing remarkable about this condition. To 
illustrate the point quantitatively, we assign arbitrary but 
plausible values to the parameters, in order to simplify 
the calculations. Let lR = 0.5; (B/L) = 1 and β = 1. With 
the value of lR referred to, the maximum sustainable rate 
is twice the international rate. With these parameters, 
the permanence condition is: C/R ≤ p + y – (i – r). Or 
to put it another way, i – r ≤ p + y – C/R.
Let us suppose, for example, that the inflation 
rate is p = p* = 3%, the growth rate y = 6% and the 
international interest rate r = 5%. With these figures the 
degree of autonomy is permanent, for example, when i 
exceeds r by no more than two percentage points while 
annual purchases by the central bank do not represent 
more than 7% of reserves. In this example, the maximum 
sustainable rate is imax = 10%. Larger purchases will 
gradually reduce it but will not render the sterilization 
policy unsustainable in the short term.
Case 2
In this case, the inflation rate in the economy is higher 
than the international rate, p > p*, so that e = p – p* > 0. 
The central bank, meanwhile, applies an inflation targeting 
policy, using a truncated Taylor rule (not taking account 
of the gap between actual and potential output):
  i = γ p (13)
where γ > 1 is the parameter of the rule. Now we wish 
to determine the highest sustainable value of the policy 
parameter.
Substituting the exchange rate into expression (6), 
the sustainability condition of the sterilization policy is: 
i	≤	(r	+	p	–	p*)	/	lR = imax.. Substituting (13) into this 
expression, we get: γ p ≤ (r + p – p*) / lR, whence:
 γ  ≤	[	1 + (r	–	p*)	/	p)]	/	lR (14)
The right-hand term of expression (14) is the maxi-
mum value of the policy rule parameter that preserves 
the sustainability of the sterilization policy. The term 
in square brackets is 1 plus the ratio between the real 
international interest rate and the local inflation rate. 
If lR < 1, values of γ  well in excess of 1 are clearly 
sustainable.
Substituting the exchange rate into (11), the per-
manence condition comes out as: C/R ≤ [lR / (1 – lR)] 
{( B/L ) β (p + y) – [ i – (r + p – p*)]}, and substituting 
the policy rule (13) and grouping gives:
	 C/R	≤	[lR	/	(1	–	lR)] {( B/L ) β (p + y) –
 [(γ	–	1)	p	–	(r	–	p*)	]} (15)
The permanence of the sustainability condition 
holds provided that international currency purchases 
meet condition (15) and the expression is positive. 
In other words, (B/L) β (p + y) > (γ – 1) p – (r – p*). 
The condition states that the increase in monetary base 
demand as a proportion of the stock of interest-bearing 
liabilities must be greater than the difference between 
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(Original	Spanish)
the real local interest rate (γ – 1) p and the real interna-
tional interest rate.
As in the previous case, we attributed arbitrary but 
plausible values to the parameters to provide a simple 
quantitative illustration of the results. Let lR = 0.5, (B/L) 
= 1 and β = 1. The permanence condition (15) then comes 
out as: C/R ≤ (p + y) – [(γ – 1) p – (r – p*)].
Let us suppose, for example, that the international 
inflation rate is p* = 3%, the international interest rate 
r = 5%, the local inflation rate p = 10%, the growth rate 
y = 6% and the policy parameter γ = 1.5 (consequently, 
interest rate i = 15%).
With these data, the maximum sustainable γ para-
meter is 2.4 and the permanence of the sustainability 
condition holds if annual purchases of international 
currency do not represent more than 13% of reserves. 
As can be seen, there is a high degree of autonomy and 
this is preserved in conditions that are by no means out 
of the ordinary.
It might be interesting to consider a numerical 
example with a lower growth rate (implying a lower 
rate of growth in monetary base demand) and a severer 
anti-inflation policy (implying a greater financial cost 
for sterilization), similar to those seen in Brazil in 
recent years. Suppose the growth rate y = 3% and the 
policy parameter γ = 2. In this numerical example the 
sterilization policy is also sustainable, but the degree 
of autonomy is preserved only when annual purchases 
by the central bank do not exceed 5% of reserves. It 
must be emphasized once again, however, that larger 
purchases do not mean that the sterilization policy is 
rendered rapidly unsustainable, but that the degree of 
autonomy is reduced gradually. If annual purchases by 
the central bank are higher than the figures given, once 
the expansion of the bank’s interest-bearing liabilities 
cancels out the difference between the maximum sus-
tainable parameter and the parameter actually applied, 
the central bank must opt either to abandon the policy 
rule, which is becoming unsustainable, or to leave the 
real exchange rate to appreciate. In this example, the 
problem of sustainability arises because the growth rate 
is very low and the interest rate very high.
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